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A Plea for Risk
PHILIP A. EBERT AND SIMON ROBERTSON
Mountaineering is a dangerous activity. For many mountaineers,
part of its very attraction is the risk, the thrill of danger. Yet mountai-
neers are often regarded as reckless or even irresponsible for risking
their lives. In this paper, we offer a defence of risk-taking inmountai-
neering. Our discussion is organised around the fact that mountai-
neers and non-mountaineers often disagree about how risky
mountaineering really is. We hope to cast some light on the nature
of this disagreement – and to argue that mountaineering may actually
beworthwhile because of the risks it involves. Section 1 introduces the
disagreement and, in doing so, separates out several different notions
of risk. Sections 2–4 then consider some explanations of the disagree-
ment, showing how a variety of phenomena can skew people’s risk
judgements. Section 5 then surveys some recent statistics, to see
whether these illuminate how risky mountaineering is. In light of
these considerations, however, we suggest that the disagreement is
best framed not simply in terms of how risky mountaineering is but
whether the risks it does involve are justified. The remainder of the
paper, sections 6–9, argues that risk-taking in mountaineering often
is justified – and, moreover, that mountaineering can itself be justi-
fied (in part) by and because of the risks it involves.
1. Disagreement about risk
It is common for mountaineers to find themselves in disagreement
with non-mountaineers about the degree and nature of risk involved
in mountaineering. On the one hand, many non-mountaineers have a
certain image of a mountaineer in mind, one often ‘informed’ by
stereotypes of a risk-seeking climber. On the other hand, while
mountaineers usually acknowledge that there are risks, they tend to
regard these as ‘acceptable’ and suggest that non-mountaineers
often overestimate them. After all, they urge that competence and
experience reduce the risks – and the remaining risks are worth
taking: it is such things as the spirit of adventure, the beauty of
remote places, the aesthetic of movement, and the comradeship of
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the rope, say, that not only motivate their risk-taking but also make
the risks worth it.1
Let us dwell on this disagreement a bit. There are two common
ways to resolve a disagreement. One is to show that (at least) one
party is mistaken. The other is to dissolve the disagreement by
showing that the different parties are not actually disagreeing; in
the present context, for instance, one could demonstrate that they
are actually employing different notions of ‘risk’ and are therefore
talking past one another. We will discuss the second option first.
It is common to distinguish different aspects of risk. One aspect
concerns the likelihood that a certain event occurs. There is also a
loss aspect: an event is risky if its occurrence would bring a significant
loss.Most often, risk is viewed as a combination of these: something’s
being risky depends on both the likelihood of its occurring and the
seriousness of the loss were it to occur. Lastly, there is also amore psy-
chologistic notion of risk: risk is often associated with feeling out of
control. People don’t always clearly distinguish these different
aspects.2 Thus, there could be occasions when disagreements
between mountaineers and non-mountaineers are explained by the
fact that they are deploying different notions of risk and hence are
talking past each other. However, we doubt that all such disagree-
ments can be explained away like that. When they cannot be so ex-
plained, further work is required to resolve the disagreement.
In the following, we treat risk as a combination of the likelihood of
an accident occurring and the significance of the resulting loss. Then,
it seems, the disagreement about risk in mountaineering will be due
to conflicting judgements about at least one of these two ingredients.
Before turning to the likelihood aspect, we’ll briefly consider the loss
component.
One possible thought here is that many mountaineers may actually
judge the prospect of injury (or even death) more acceptable than
1 InMotivations forMountain Climbing: The Role of Risk (University of
Sussex, U.K., PhD-Thesis, 2011), Nina Lockwood shows via a number
studies that although risk is one important part of a mountaineers’ motiv-
ation, risk per se is not the key motivating factor. See also E. Brymer,
Extreme Dude: A Phenomenological Perspective on the Extreme Sports
Experience (University of Wollongong, Australia., PhD-Thesis 2005),
which highlights various ‘spiritual’ elements informing the motivations of
many mountaineers.
2 For a useful survey of different notions of risk and risk perception, see
Wibecke Brun, ‘Risk Perception: Main Issues, Approaches and Findings’,
in G. Wright and P. Ayton (eds), Subjective Probability (Chichester: John
Wiley and Sons, 1994): 395–420.
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many non-mountaineers do. For one thing, mountaineers may hear
about climbing-related injuries and simply come to regard these as
‘part of the game’ they love. Importantly, though, they also hear of
fellow climbers recovering from serious injuries and returning to
the sport. This may in turn ‘desensitise’ mountaineers in ways that
make commonplace losses appear less serious. Thus, the thought
goes, conflicting risk verdicts might sometimes be explained by dif-
fering views about how bad bad outcomes actually are. However, we
think that there are also likely to be other, more relevant explanations
for the disagreement. We’ll now turn to the likelihood aspect.
2. Heuristics and biases when judging mountaineering risks
Given that relatively few people (mountaineers or not) actually study
statistics about the relation between mountaineering and risk, when
making judgements about those risks it seems that we naturally rely
on certain ‘heuristics’: useful shortcuts that help us reach conclusions
efficiently, including (for our purposes) conclusions about the likeli-
hood of an event occurring. Although these shortcuts may yield ade-
quate judgements in many cases, they can sometimes result in
inaccurate judgements or biases.
Psychologists have identified a number of such heuristics. The first
we’ll look at is the so-called availability heuristic.3 The idea, roughly,
is that when people face difficult questions about the frequency of a
category – numbers of dangerous plants, divorces among couples
over 60, or, more relevantly, deaths while mountaineering – people
often think of relevant instances of this category by retrieving them
from memory. In cases where the retrieval is easy and straightfor-
ward, people tend to think the category has many such instances.
In cases where instances aren’t so easily obtained, people tend to
think there will be fewer instances. However, the easiness of recalling
such instances might not always be a very good guide to judging fre-
quencies. In the present context, given that mountaineering disasters
make for good newspaper headlines and are often widely publicised
(even made into movies), it becomes fairly easy to recall instances
3 First introduced in Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, ‘Judgement
under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’, Science 185 (1974), 1124–31.
Kahneman’s excellent Thinking, Fast and Slow (London: Penguin Books,
2011) discusses many other heuristics and biases; see also C.F. Chabris &
D.J. Simons, The Invisible Gorilla: How Our Intuitions Deceive Us
(New York: Broadway Publishers, 2011).
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that exhibit the dangers of mountaineering. And since non-mountai-
neers can readily retrieve such disasters frommemory, thismight lead
them to overestimate the risks in mountaineering. This is not to say
that they definitely do overestimate the risk (wewill look at some stat-
istics later) but rather a warning that the intuitive mechanism people
use to judge those risks might be less reliable than they realise.
Another relevant factor is imaginability. In their original article,
Kahneman and Tversky mention the following case:
Imaginability plays an important role in the evaluation of prob-
abilities in real-life situations. The risk involved in an adventur-
ous expedition, for example, is evaluated by imagining
contingencies with which the expedition is not equipped to
cope. If many such difficulties are vividly portrayed, the
expedition can be made to appear exceedingly dangerous,
although the ease with which disasters are imagined need not
reflect their actual likelihood.4
Such considerations could help explain why people tend to overesti-
mate the likelihood of accidents in mountaineering, though they will
not explain why mountaineers and non-mountaineers differ in their
judgements. However, a further heuristic, the so-called affect heuris-
tic, expands on the imaginability idea and may help to explain this
disagreement. According to the affect heuristic, it is not only the
ease with which climbing disasters come to mind that affects our
risk judgement, but also our emotional reactions to those disasters.
Death in mountaineering conjures up frightening images of long
falls leading to horrid injuries, or of long and painful suffering
before dying. In short, to die in mountaineering is to die a gruesome
and often lonely death; and such thoughts can exacerbate fear. The
affect heuristic describes how our risk judgements are influenced by
such emotional reactions. We here have a case where the difficult
question about the actual risk in mountaineering is substituted by
the easier question of how one feels about the activity (especially in
light of the bad outcomes one might conjure up). What the affect
heuristic implies is that the disagreement with respect to mountai-
neering risks might notmerely be a disagreement about the presumed
likelihood of a bad outcome but that it also involves an important
emotional dimension. Non-mountaineers, who have no positive
emotional attachment to the activity and who might recall only
emotionally distressing outcomes, are likely to judge the risks higher
4 Kahneman & Tversky, op. cit. note 3, 1128.
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than mountaineers.5 Hence, the affect heuristic may explain why
mountaineers and non-mountaineers differ when judging the risks.
3. Media bias and risk
In addition to the above heuristics, there are further elements that
may help explain the disagreement. There is, in particular, an impor-
tant element of media bias. Due towidespreadmedia-coverage, many
non-mountaineers are aware of numerous mountaineering fatalities.
To name but a few: Mallory’s ill-fated 1924 Everest expedition; the
1996 disaster on Everest when eight mountaineers died; and the
2012 tragedies on both Everest and Mont Blanc (four mountaineers
died on Everest, nine from a single avalanche on Mont Blanc). It is
fair to say that most mountaineering related news a non-mountaineer
receives concerns the dangers it involves. Yet comparatively few
mountaineering successes (or even great achievements) arementioned
in national media. For example, thePiolet d’Or – the most prestigious
award for outstandingmountaineering achievement, given on a yearly
basis – hasn’t been covered by the BBC news website.6 Typically, we
only hear about successful mountaineering endeavours when a new
‘record’ is set (the youngest or oldest or fastest alpinist to ascend a
well-known peak, say) or when the first 3G phone-call is made
from Everest’s summit. Mountaineers, though, are more likely to
hear about a wide range of impressive achievements (through specific
climbing media, friends, and so on).7 Given another feature of our
cognitive life, namely that humans have a tendency to regard the evi-
dence they have as all the evidence there is,8 this media-bias may
explain why non-mountaineers judge the activity very risky.
In addition, as Nick Colton9 nicely observes, there is a further side to
mountaineering that rarely makes it into current media and that many
non-mountaineers are unaware of. Colton distinguishes two ‘models’ of
a mountaineer. There is a conqueror-model, on which mountaineers are
goal-oriented conquerors – very much the type of figure that might
make it into the news and sustain common stereotypes. But there is
5 See Kahneman op. cit. note 3, chs.12 & 13.
6 At least it returns no search results on their website.
7 Granted, as mountaineers we also hear more about talented mountai-
neers who die but who don’t make it into mainstream news.
8 Labelled by Kahneman (op. cit. note 3) the ‘what you see is all there is’
(WYSIATI) principle.
9 Nick Colton, ‘Conquerors or Connoisseurs?’ On the Edge 115 (2005),
64–65.
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also a connoisseur-model. Here, the mountaineer is less goal-oriented
and is not climbing at the limit of her ability; she instead climbs less
risky routes and is motivated largely by aesthetic considerations (of
movement, or beautiful surroundings, say). While non-mountaineers
often know little about the connoisseur-model, most mountaineers
move from one model to the other and thus have a more informed,
indeed balanced view of their activity. As a result, mountaineers are
likely to judge mountaineering as a whole less risky than someone
who is exposed only to popular media conceptions of it.
4. Risk, uncertainty, competence
The final aspect we’ll consider when it comes to explaining disagree-
ments about the degree of risk concerns mountaineers’ competence.
By climbing regularly, mountaineers become more ‘in tune’ with
the risks involved, developing the skills to identify, assess and
manage them. When a non-mountaineer looks at a rock face and
thinks it crazy for anyone to climb, a competent climber might see
an established and well-protected route on immaculate rock and
rightly judge it not very risky. What for a non-mountaineer will
seem an unquantifiable uncertainty, and hence be judged too risky,
may to a mountaineer’s eye present a more specifiable and indeed
lower risk. Hence, competence plays an important role in making in-
formed judgements about mountaineering dangers.10
So far we have offered different ways to explain how the disagree-
ment about risk in mountaineering can arise. These explanations
combine nicely to offer a multifaceted picture of the possible
sources of disagreement. However, we haven’t settled yet who is
correct in their risk judgement. It is now time to have a look at
some recent statistics and to discuss how they might help adjudicate
whether non-mountaineers overestimate the risks or whether moun-
taineers underestimate them.
5. Accident statistics
Statistics available from European Alpine Clubs usually only provide
the number of accidents (including deaths) that occur in mountains.
To properly evaluate the risks involved, however, this isn’t enough.
10 We return to the role of competence in section 8.
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To see why, let us look at the fatalities involved in the following
activities in Germany and Switzerland in 2010:11
What is surprising is that hillwalking results in more fatal accidents
in Switzerland than the other activities listed here combined (in that
year)! However, the total number of accidents is not a good indication
for how dangerous the activity is, unless we have some indication of
how many people are engaged in it. Even then, there are further dif-
ficulties. We cannot straightforwardly use the population of Swiss
hillwalkers as a base class, since many people who hillwalk in
Switzerland come from other countries. Moreover, finding out how
many people go hillwalking in Switzerland is not enough: some
may go hillwalking every week, others once a month, and so on.
So, to more accurately quantify the dangers across these activities
we would need to know how many fatal accidents occur per day (or
even hour) spent doing them.12 Unfortunately, there are very few
Table 1.
11 The data is drawn from official accident statistics issued by the
German and the Swiss Alpine Clubs, available on their respective websites.
We here focus on fatality rate, though similar considerations apply to injury
rate and severity.
12 Most statistics do not use exposure time but rather go by mountaineer,
climb or summiteer (the latter two thereby excluding those who turned back
without summiting because of the risks involved). This makes a comparison
to other activities difficult; see: http://www.medicine.ox.ac.uk/bandolier/
booth/risk/sports.html. We here make the simplifying assumption that the
dangers are quantified by fatality rate only. Ideally, we would also need to
know the injury rate and seriousness of those injuries. There is, however,
little information available on this. See also fn 21.
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such statistics. Nonetheless, the following was published by the
German Alpine Club:13
It is important to note that, although Table 1 suggests that hillwalk-
ing (in Switzerland) has surprisinglymany deaths in comparison to the
other activities listed, when normalised to hours spent (as in Table 2)
alpine climbing has a considerably higher fatality rate (amongst
members of the German Alpine Club). Now there may be a tempta-
tion, when assessing the risks of the activities listed under Table 2,
to compare these with the fatality rates (per hours of exposure) for
other (non-mountainous) activities. And doing so may appear to
deliver some surprising results: cycling (∼0.46)14, motorcycling
(∼3.42–8,5)15, competitive marathon running (∼1.5)16, swimming in
Table 2.
13 Peter Randelzhofer, ‘Wie riskant is Bergsport?’, Panorama 2 (2010)
68–70 (not a peer-reviewed journal). The statistics are based on accidents
by members of the German Alpine Club (800,000 members), with the
exposure time calculated on the basis of 7,900 returned questionnaires.
14 Based on transport statistics for Great Britain 1979–89, accessed from
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/road_safety/specialist/knowledge/ped-
estrians/crash_characteristics_where_and_how/data_considerations.htm
15 Based on the transport statistics for Great Britain 1979–89 (lower
number) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration USA
(http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811639.pdf) for 2010 using the
average speed of 35mph to calculate exposure time.
16 Calculated on the basis of Simon Matthews, ‘Mortality Among
Marathon Runners in the United States, 2000–2009’, Am J Sports Med
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New South Wales (Australia) (2.5)17. This certainly looks surprising:
alpine climbing and mountaineering aren’t as dangerous as these
other (supposedly more mundane) activities! However, much care
has to be taken before reading too much into such comparisons.
Here are some reasons why: Firstly, the statistic is based on members
of the German Alpine Club, who have easy access to affordable
outdoor education and training. So we may assume that the sample
is biased towards more informed, better trained mountaineers.18
Secondly, the statistic is based on German Alpine Club members,
who, we may assume, pursue their activities mainly in and around
Germany; yet most of the higher and more dangerous alpine ranges
lie outside Germany. So, we surmise, the above statistic may underes-
timate the risks ofmountaineering in general andmight not yet provide
a solid basis for comparison with non-mountaineering activities.
Furthermore, it would be wrong to conclude from this that moun-
taineering isn’t dangerous. For one thing, there are ‘many games
climbers play’:19 high-altitude climbing, fast and light alpine climb-
ing, big wall climbing, ice climbing, ski-mountaineering, sport
climbing, soloing, and more. And there are different ways to play
these games – as connoisseurs or conquerors, for instance. These
different games and ways to play them have very different associated
risks. On the one hand, for instance, the fatality rate for climbing
Denali (6196m) is roughly 6.3 fatalities per 1 million hours exposure
time;20 and the results for some other high-altitude routes will likely
40 (2012), 1495–500. Note that this is based on competitive races, rather
than training (which is usually associated with lower fatality risk).
17 Damian Morgan, ‘Estimates of Drowning Morbidity and Mortality
Adjusted for Exposure to Risk’, Injury Prevention, 17 (2011), 359–359.
For a much higher number, see R.J. Mitchell, A.M. Williamson & J.
Olivier, ‘Estimates of Drowning Morbidity and Mortality Adjusted for
Exposure to Risk’, Injury Prevention, 16 (2010), 261–266.
18 Many accidents are likely due to incompetence and lack of experi-
ence; and so this selection bias could make for a lower than average fatality
rate.
19 See Lito Tejada-Flores, ‘Games Climbers Play’, in The Games
Climbers Play (London: Diadem Book, 1978).
20 Based on S.E. McIntosh, A.D. Campbell, J. Dow, et al.,
‘Mountaineering Fatalities on Denali’, High Alt Med Biol 9 (2008):
89–95. It is worth noting that the fatality rate at Denali is slowly decreasing.
However, other statistics suggest that the high-altitude game is very danger-
ous; see J.S. Windsor, P.G. Firth, M.P. Grocott, G.W. Rodway, & H.E.
Montgomery, ‘Mountain Mortality: A Review of Deaths that Occur
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be even worse. Yet on the other hand, other climbing activities – like
sports climbing and indoor climbing, which often involve quite long
falls – have a low risk of injury and death.21 So, what can we take from
this and how can it inform the above disagreement?
While the German study may suggest that mountaineering
considered as a general activity (encompassing all different sub-
disciplines, including alpine climbing and skitouring) are not as
high-risk as often thought, there is no denying that some specific
mountaineering games are (statistically speaking) very dangerous.22
During Recreational Activities in the Mountains’, Postgraduate Medical
Journal, 85 (2009), 316–321.
21 L.C. Schussmann, L.J. Lutz, R.R. Shaw, et al., ‘The Epidemiology
of Mountaineering and Rock Climbing Accidents’,Wilderness EnvironMed
1 (1990), 235–48, suggests that rock climbing has a lower injury risk than
football or horse riding. A. Neuhof, F. F. Hennig, I. Schöffl, & V.
Schöffl, ‘Injury Risk Evaluation in Sport Climbing’, International Journal
of Sports Medicine 32 (2011), 794–800 and V. Schöffl, A. Morrison, U.
Schwarz, I. Schoffl, & T. Küpper, ‘Evaluation of Injury and Fatality Risk
in Rock and Ice Climbing’, Sports Medicine 40 (2010), 657–679, comes to
a similar conclusion: sport climbing and indoor climbing have a lower
injury rate than activities like rugby, football (soccer) and basketball.
22 So, for example, in a recent movie Steve House, a professional high-al-
titude mountaineer who pioneered light and fast alpine approaches in greater
mountain ranges, noted that he has shared his rope with 19 climbers who
have since died (https://vimeo.com/40379197). Similarly, Will Gadd, a
leading ice climber, writes: ‘I often hear friends make statistically insane com-
ments such as, “You can die on the way to the mountains just as easily as you
can die in the mountains”. That statement, for the record, is a stinking pile of
self-delusional excrement that does not smell any less foul with repeated
exposure’, noting that 27 of his friends have so far died in the mountains
(http://explore-mag.com/2831/adventure/the-grand-delusion). Gadd is
right that certain mountaineering sub-disciplines are extremely risky; and,
given that he is a leading exponent in several of these sub-disciplines, he will
be exposed to many more fatalities than the average mountaineer. Note,
however, that this is compatible with our main claim: that certain forms of
climbing are extremely dangerous while, on thewhole, the general activity (en-
compassing all age groups andmany different forms ofmountaineering) is not.
Aswell as these theoretical concerns, there is a practical reason not to infer from
general statistics too much about a particular situation when more pertinent
information is available: just as there is little comfort in reminding yourself
that shark attacks are very unlikelywhen you are swimming in the open sea sur-
rounded by a great white, there is little point in reminding yourself of the
climbing stats when you’re totally pumped facing a potential ground fall.
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Could this observation be used to explain the disagreement between
mountaineers and non-mountaineers?
Maybe there is a story that can be told here that would dissolve the
disagreement: perhaps mountaineers are correct with respect to the
overall activity, whereas non-mountaineers are correct with respect
to some quite specific mountaineering games. Hence, they are not
really disagreeing because they are making judgements about differ-
ent things. But even so, there may be a way for non-mountaineers to
maintain that mountaineering as a general activity is too risky, even
assuming that accident rates are fairly low. The thought is this:
Whether mountaineering is too risky doesn’t depend merely on the
fatality or injury rate, but is rather a matter of whether the kinds of
risks mountaineers willingly take on are justified. Hence, the judg-
ment that mountaineering is ‘too risky’ is best explained as a norma-
tive judgement ( justification being a normative notion). This, we
suspect, may be what really underlies the disagreement.23
To motivate this concern consider, by way of contrast, the case of
marathon running: here most fatalities are caused by cardiac arrest,
due most likely to an underlying genetic disposition. Such deaths
are not foreseeable or ‘to be expected’; and a competent runner
wouldn’t ordinarily be to blame for putting herself at such a risk.24
Yet, so the charge might go, mountaineers knowingly put themselves
into a risky situation: there is always the possibility of a minor slip, a
little stumble that ‘so easily happens’ (yet, statistically speaking,
rarely does) but that can kill you. There are also objective dangers
when crossing glaciers, traversing underneath seracs, or climbing a
rock face. Of course, these can be minimised by experience, compe-
tence, good equipment, paying attention to reliable weather forecasts,
and so on. Nonetheless, there are always residual risks and taking
these on is, to put it crudely, no different than taking part in a
lottery – in which most people ‘get away with it’ but those who
don’t lose their lives on a gamble. Of course, such tragedies rarely
happen, and the risk might be minimal in many cases (even though
23 Indeed, one can easily imagine a situation in which a mountaineer
and non-mountaineer are equally informed and sensitive to both the distort-
ing effects of the heuristics, media bias, etc., considered in sections 2–4 and
the available statistical data – yet still disagree over whether mountaineering
is ‘too’ risky.Here, it looks plausible to say that, their disagreement is really a
normative one.
24 Fatalities in hillwalking are also often due to cardiac arrest (roughly
50% according to the German accident statistic; it is dramatically less in
the case of alpine climbing).
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they are easily imagined and there are many stories involving ‘close-
calls’). Still, perhaps, we should expect them to happen. Given this,
taking on the risks in mountaineering isn’t justified; and a climber
is ultimately reckless for risking her life on a gamble.
6. Risky, Despite and Because: three claims about risk and
justification
The suggestion, then, is that the disagreement betweenmountaineers
and (informed) non-mountaineers may not be simply about how risky
mountaineering is, but whether the risks it does involve are justified.
Assuming so, let’s characterise the objection to mountaineering as
follows:
[Risky] Mountaineering is not a justifiable activity; and that is
because of the risks it involves.
In the rest of the paper, we takes issue with [Risky] and argue that
mountaineering can be (i.e. sometimes is) justified. If our arguments
are plausible, this will help resolve the disagreement about mountai-
neering risks in favour of mountaineers.
Now one way to oppose [Risky] is to claim that mountaineering is
justified despite the risks it involves, since the disvalue of those risks is
counterbalanced by various other goodsmountaineering offers.We’ll
call this ‘[Despite]’:
[Despite] Mountaineering endeavours can be justified; when
they are justified, they are justified (a) despite the risks they
involve, and (b) by the further goods (distinct from risk) they
bring (not by the risks themselves).
[Despite] appears to have become something of an orthodoxy in the
few academic discussions on this topic.25 However, we think that
25 There are various versions of [Despite]. According to some, moun-
taineering is justified because it cultivates virtues of character (like
courage, self-resilience, discipline, humility, even compassion) which in
turn makes us better people. See for example the essays by Charlton,
Treanor and Sailors in S.E. Schmidt (ed.), Climbing: Because It’s There
(Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010) – and, for criticism, Dudley Knowles,
‘Review of Climbing: Because It’s There’, Philosophical Quarterly 61
(2001), 887–90. For a rather different approach, which we consider below,
see Kevin Krein, ‘Nature and Risk in Adventure Sports’, in M.
McNamee (ed.), Philosophy, Risk and Adventure Sports (Oxon:
Routledge, 2007).
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[Despite], even though it gets to the (correct) conclusion that moun-
taineering is justifiable, gives the wrong explanation for this. In what
follows, we’ll therefore challenge orthodoxy by arguing that risk is
one of the things that actually gives mountaineering its value,
whereby mountaineering has the value it does in part because of the
risks it involves. We’ll argue for this in Sections 7 and 8. Section 9
then uses this to get to the following conclusion:
[Because]: Mountaineering endeavours can be justified – (in
part) because of the value that engaging with mountaineering
risks has.26
Our arguments for [Because], if defensible, will in turn undermine
[Risky]. In defending [Because], our claim is that it is partly in
virtue of the residual risks associated with the possibility of injury
or death – due to falling, getting lost on a big face, or failing to over-
come the physical challenges – that mountaineering is valuable and
sometimes justified.
7. The role of risk
We’ll begin our case by noting four assumptions. First, mountaineer-
ing does involve some risk. Second, mountaineers know this, yet
knowingly and intentionally put themselves into risk situations by
mountaineering. Nonetheless, and third, they typically put them-
selves into situations in which they believe the risks are ‘acceptable’
– situations in which they believe they can (and will) reduce or other-
wise control the risk to (what they judge is) an ‘acceptable level’.27
Fourth, good mountaineers are generally competent at assessing the
risks of the climbs they undertake. These points are important.
They allow us to say that, although mountaineers intentionally put
themselves into risk situations, insofar as they are competent at
judging whether the risks are acceptable they need not be the fool-
hardy risk-seekers commonly portrayed by popular media.
To help motivate our views about the value of risk, we’ll contrast
them to a line of thought recently pushed by a proponent of
[Despite]. Kevin Krein argues that mountaineering can be worth
26 Although [Despite] seems the orthodoxy within academic circles, in
our discussions with mountaineers something more like [Because] is com-
monly accepted.
27 This is a repeated theme throughout mountaineering literature. See
also the interviews in N. O’Connell, Beyond Risk: Conversations with
Climbers (London: Diadem Books, 1995).
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doing, despite the risks, given the value of various other goods it rea-
lizes.28 Such goods include, on the one hand, interacting with nature,
the opportunity to challenge oneself, freedom from certain rule-
governed aspects of social life,29 and, on the other hand, certain ‘ex-
periential goods’ like pleasure and exhilaration, and attending senses
of personal fulfilment.30 Realizing such goods may require taking
certain risks. Nonetheless, Krein believes, risk-taking is only a
means to these other (independently specifiable) goods and has no
real value aside from that. Hence we get a version of [Despite]: the
value of mountaineering consists in a range of goods that are distinct
from (specifiable independently of) risk and that do not depend for
their value on risk itself having any (non-instrumental) value.
Now we agree that mountaineering can be valuable in virtue of the
various goods Krein recognises. However, we doubt that the experi-
ential goods he mentions, when they come frommountaineering, can
be so easily separated from the risks involved in mountaineering. To
see why, it will be useful to outline a central part of Krein’s argument
for [Despite]. Krein supposes that what motivates mountaineers to
climb gives a good indication of what is valuable about mountaineer-
ing. Mountaineers are often motivated by experiential goods like ex-
hilaration. However, he believes, it is not the risk as such that
motivates, because there are much easier ways to get the kinds of
experiences to which risk-taking in mountaineering gives rise.31
And thus, since one could get these experiential goods without
mountaineering, the value of mountaineering must lie in something
other than the risks it involves – for instance, the experiential goods
it brings. Hence we get to a version of [Despite].
However, we think it highly questionable whether mountaineers
could experience sufficiently similar kinds of exhilaration and fulfil-
ment in ways other than mountaineering. For the kinds of exhilarat-
ing and fulfilment mountaineers get from (facing and overcoming the
residual risks involved in) mountaineering are typically quite specific
tomountaineering: surmounting technically difficult, exposed, or un-
protected climbs; being isolated or committed on a big mountain
face; the experience of prolonged physical adversity; and so on.
28 Krein, op. cit. note 25. Krein’s arguments are more nuanced than we
can do justice to here; we examine them in greater detail in ‘Mountaineering
and the Value of Risk’ (unpublished manuscript).
29 Op. cit. note 25, 87–91.
30 Op. cit. note 25, 82–3.
31 Op. cit. note 25, 84. Krein mentions driving fast and Russian
roulette.
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Take all these elements away andwhatever experiences of exhilaration
or fulfilment one might get will be qualitatively rather different from
the experience of risk in a mountaineering situation. So, sure, you can
get exhilaration frommany activities besidesmountaineering. But the
kind of exhilaration and fulfilment involved inmountaineering is very
different from that generated by these other activities – and cannot be
replicated by them.32
Nevertheless, we can learn fromKrein’s argument.One of the things
we think problematic about it is its underlying assumption that the
risks involved in mountaineering are merely means to other, indepen-
dently specifiable goods – but somewhat unfortunate or undesirable
means, whereby mountaineers would eliminate the risks more or less
entirely if only they could.33 We’ve implicitly been suggesting an
alternative view: risk-taking is constitutively bound up with mountai-
neering –with both the very activity and the experiential goods like ex-
hilaration it brings. More precisely, risk is not just a means to these
other goods but a constitutive and ineliminable part of them; the char-
acter of these goods, when realized through mountaineering, is shaped
by the risks which can bring them about and that are quite specific to
mountaineering. Crucially, then, insofar as mountaineers cannot
experience the same kind of exhilaration (say) from other activities, a
constitutive ingredient in these forms of exhilaration and fulfilment
is the fact that they involve overcoming the risks involved in mountai-
neering. These ‘constitutive’ theses will be central to our positive
account of the value of risk, to which we now turn.
8. The value of risk
We’ve so far talked rather loosely about the ‘value of (engaging with)
risk’. This section clarifies what we mean: first by clarifying what is
involved in engagingwith risk, second by outlining what it is about en-
gaging with risk that has value, third by explaining what kind of value
32 Some mountaineers are drawn to these other activities. However,
they often say that they do them for a different (sometimes a comparatively
safe) kind of exhilaration. Moreover, they often report, they don’t find these
other activities as fulfilling. For a particularly poignant example, see Lionel
Terray, Conquistadors of the Useless (London: Bâton-Wicks, 2008), 296–8 –
whereTerray records howhis friendLouis Lachenal, no longer able to climb
seriously given the frostbite he incurred on the first ascent of Annapurna,
unsuccessfully sought a surrogate by driving dangerously.
33 Krein, op. cit. note 25, 83, 86, 88.
59
A Plea for Risk
this is. We’ll then be in a position to state our thesis that risk is one of
the things that gives mountaineering its value and makes it justified.
First, then, risk is something mountaineers ‘engage with’; and it is
this engagement that we’ll argue can contribute to the value mountai-
neering has. But what dowemean by ‘engaging with risk’? One thing it
involves is taking a risk. However, risk-taking can go very wrong. For
that reason, we are not committing to the claim that risk-taking is
always or in all circumstances valuable or justified. Rather, the value
of engaging with risk comes from both taking and overcoming risk.
However, that’s not quite adequate either: someone might by sheer
luck overcome a risk that it is exceptionally reckless to take. The
central case in which engaging with mountaineering risks has value,
we therefore suggest, is when the risk is taken and overcome competently.
There are several things such competence involves; we’ll mention
two. First, the risk-taker must be warranted in believing, given the
evidence available to her, that the risk is not unacceptable (where that
evidence includes evidence about both the intended route and her
own abilities) – i.e. is something she has the skill to overcome.34
Second, the process of taking and overcoming the riskmust be executed
with a sufficient degree of mountaineering skill. For short we’ll call this
‘competent risk-engagement’. Risk-taking is of course an essential
component of competent risk-engagement. And, we want to say,
risk-taking itself can have value. Its value, however, typically
depends on the risks being overcome competently.
Second, if risk-taking in mountaineering has value that is because
of the role it plays in relation to various other features ofmountaineer-
ing which themselves have value. What features do we have in mind?
On the one hand, they include quite general goods to which moun-
taineering gives expression – goods commonly associated with im-
pressive and admirable human achievements: adventure and
exploration, overcoming challenges few are capable of meeting, the
telling of incredible skill and determination, and so on.
On the other hand, risk-taking is good in relation to the value of
(what we’ll continue to label, subject to some provisos to follow)
certain ‘experiential’ goods. Two are particularly notable. One is
that risk-taking can make one ‘feel alive’ and ‘in the zone’. This
may take multifarious forms. It can involve a supercharged adrena-
line rush; but it can also have a more serene, meditative and
34 One might be warranted in believing that p, even though not-p; so
‘warrant’ here is not factive. For a fuller account, see Simon Robertson,
‘Epistemic Constraints on Practical Normativity’, Synthese 181 Supp.1
(2011): 81–106.
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sublime exhilarative quality. In either case, the experience often in-
volves a heightened focus upon and appreciation of both yourself
and your surroundings, in which salient features of your situation
take on an intensified quality – yet a kind of ‘wholeness’ in which
you are not only vividly aware of both yourself and your surround-
ings, but feel ‘at one’with all around you. These quite intense experi-
ences of utter exhilaration often extend long after the real danger is
over and can give rise to a sense of personal fulfilment.35 A second
value – one that particularly to attends overcoming mountaineering
risks competently – concerns the ways mountaineers experience them-
selves as agents. Again this has numerous dimensions. It can involve
quite simply experiencing yourself as an effective agent: in general
terms, you achieve the things you set out to achieve by competently
overcoming the risks constitutive of the challenges you set yourself;
at a more specific level, the experience of moving competently (flu-
ently, in control) through the medium in which you are climbing
gives rise to a deeply gratifying experience of effective agency.
Furthermore, it can involve expressing, through the activity of climb-
ing, something about who you really are andwhat is deeply important
to you; indeed, many mountaineers talk about how climbing is some-
thing they need to do in order to be who they really are. This, plau-
sibly, is why they get a deep sense of exhilaration and fulfilment from
mountaineering.36
35 Importantly, facing and overcoming risk often has a positive effect on
the ways we view and value aspects of more day-to-day life. To quote
extreme skier Eric Pehota from the ski movie Steep: ‘It’s the ultimate
paradox. The closer you come to dying, the more alive you feel: […] if
you just sit around on a couch and watch TV, how can you appreciate that
cold beer or that nice, big, hearty steak? But you eat soup, and live in a
cold, icy environment for two, three weeks, and, man, you get back, and
that’s the best burger you’ve ever had in your life and […] that beer could
be piss warm, and it’ll be the nicest beer you’ve had in your life’.
36 Capturing a number of these ideas, in the 1984 film of his ski descent
of the East Face of Aiguille Blanche du Peuterey, Stefano de Benedetti says,
‘This is my mode of expressing myself. This is my mode of speaking to the
others of freedom’. And in the movie Steep he says: ‘In the perfect moment,
I was so concentrated, there was no space for other thoughts. […] When you
are in a situation where if you fall you die, everything changes. […] You act
like a different person. You act with all yourself. You are making a comple-
tely different experience, and in someway you are discovering yourself. This
is the magic of the mountain. […] But to live so close to the possibility of
dying, you understand what is really important and what [is] not. […] It’s
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Two further points about the value of these experiential goods.
First, we want to say, in the context of risk it is not just the experience
(of exhilaration, say) that is valuable but the experience that is pro-
duced by actually taking and overcoming risks. Second, these valu-
able experiences can in turn be constituents of more general
abstract goods, like wellbeing and fulfilment: a person may be more
fulfilled in virtue of the experiences yielded by competently engaging
risk.
So far we have shown that competently overcoming risk in moun-
taineering is related to a variety of values involved inmountaineering:
engaging in adventurous activities, overcoming challenges, expres-
sing one’s agency, exhilaration, fulfilment, and so on. These are
general goods that almost everyone agrees have value. All this is com-
patible with [Despite], however. But there are two additional and
crucial claims that distinguish our view from [Despite]: First, risk
is a constitutive and ineliminable element of mountaineering and
the character of the experiences it brings (we argued for this
earlier). This implies that, if the risk were completely absent, the
activity engaged in wouldn’t really be a form of mountaineering
and the experiences produced would not be experiences of mountai-
neering. So, since the value of mountaineering depends in part on
the character of the experiences it brings, the value ofmountaineering
depends (in part) on the risks it involves.We thus arrive at our second
crucial claim: mountaineering and the goods it brings have the par-
ticular type of value they do (in part) because of the risks they
involve. This is distinct from [Despite], since risk is not a mere
(causal) means to the various mountaineering goods we’ve identified.
Rather, risk is a constitutive and ineliminable part of the goods them-
selves: the character and content of these values, as realised through
mountaineering, is essentially shaped by the mountaineering risks
they involve. It is in this sense that mountaineering has the value it
does (in part) because of the risk it involves.37
probably the highest moment of my life. Because in the perfect moment, I
was, or I felt to be, a little superman’.
37 To put it in more technical jargon, risk is ‘constitutively valuable’: a
constitutive feature, not just of mountaineering, but of the values mountai-
neering expresses and the valuable experiences it brings. It may be useful to
here distinguish our view from some other axiological theses. In particular,
we are not saying (1) that risk-taking is unconditionally valuable or good in all
circumstances (though we remain non-committal as to whether competent
risk-engagement is); (2) that competent risk-engagement is intrinsically va-
luable (if that implies non-relationally valuable); or (3) that risk is merely
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To summarise our argument so far, then: risk is valuable (in part)
because of the goods it realizes – goods that need not be specific
to mountaineering, but that are widely recognised as good by non-
mountaineers too. But these goods, when realized in the context of
mountaineering, have the particular value they do only because
they involve competently engaging mountaineering risks. Thus,
risk is one of the things that gives mountaineering its value,
whereby mountaineering has the value it does in part because of the
risks it involves.
9. Because it is risky
If defensible, this undermines [Risky]. [Risky] claims that, because of
the risks involved, mountaineering is not justified. But we’ve argued
that risk is one of the things that givesmountaineering its value; and it
is hard to see how something which gives mountaineering its value
could also serve to render it unjustified, especially when the risk is
overcome competently and the mountaineering goods it is constitu-
tively bound up with are widely acknowledged (by both mountai-
neers and non-mountaineers) to be valuable. So, [Risky] as a
general thesis looks false. Note, though, that we have argued
against [Risky] without recourse to the orthodox approach embodied
by [Despite]. Indeed, given that risk is a constitutive and inseparable
part of mountaineering and the goods it brings, [Despite] is wrong to
suggest that the value of these goods is independent of risk.
It may be objected that our arguments (assuming they are success-
ful) do not get us to [Because], however. For one thing, although
these arguments may show that mountaineering is not unjustified,
they do not show that it is justified; furthermore, the argument of
the last section delivered claims about the value of risk, whereas
[Because] is a claim about justification. In response, though, we will
here repeat the suggestion that competently engaging risk by moun-
taineering expresses and realizes important human values. Given
that, it is then hard to see what the objection might be to the claim
that mountaineering is justified (in part) because of the risks it
instrumentally valuable (only a means to other goods). There are several
other ways risk could be valuable – finally valuable (as an end there is
reason to pursue for its own sake), symbolically valuable (symbolic of some-
thing else of value), and more – but even if risk is valuable in such respects,
these do not get to the nub of its value.
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involves. For why could mountaineering never be justified, insofar as
(a) it is undertaken and completed competently, and (b) it expresses
and realizes deep human values? To sustain the objection against
moving from the denial of [Risky] to [Because], one would need to
give an adequate answer to that question. Such an answer, we
submit, looks unlikely.
Note, in conclusion, that our arguments also place competentmoun-
taineers in rather a strong position when it comes to the disagreement
with non-mountaineers about the risks the activity involves. On the
one hand, if the disagreement concerns how risky mountaineering as
a general activity is, what evidence there is suggests that it is less
extreme or high-risk than many people believe. While, on the other
hand, if the disagreement ultimately concerns whether or not the
risk-taking is justified, we’ve argued that it can be. One worry was
that the kinds of risk mountaineering involves render it an unjustified
gamble. However, we argued that competence reduces the odds of the
gamble, and, more importantly, that the kinds of risks the gamble in-
volves are valuable because constitutively bound up with various other
goods that everyone recognises. In short, and putting these two points
together, risks are sometimes worth taking. We should emphasise here
that we are not saying that everyone ought to take mountaineering risks,
nor even that competently overcoming such risks will always bring
about the kinds of goods we’ve identified. Rather, sometimes risk-
taking inmountaineering is justified. Finally, we’ve also implicitly pro-
vided an answer to the question mountaineers perennially face: ‘Why
mountaineer, given the risks it involves?’. Answer: ‘Because it’s risky
– and sometimes it’s good to take risks’.38
University of Stirling
p.a.ebert@stir.ac.uk
Cardiff University
robertsons3@cf.ac.uk
38 A version of this paper was presented as one of the London Lectures
on Sport hosted by the Royal Institute of Philosophy. Many thanks
to Anthony O’Hear for inviting us, and to both he and the Lecture’s audi-
ence for extremely engaging discussion. Additional thanks to an audience at
the University of Stirling for feedback on an earlier draft. We dedicate the
paper to the many climbing friends with whom we’ve shared both a rope
and some of the ‘best beers ever’. This work was supported by a grant
from the Arts and Humanities Research Council AH/J00233X/1 held by
Philip Ebert.
64
Philip A. Ebert & Simon Robertson
